178 Major Sites Served Card Skimmers: Check Statements
Hacked code on 178 major sites skimmed cards and swapped crypto on Nov 16. Who was exposed, two checks to run today, and the freeze that limits the damage.
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On Monday, November 16, visitors to websites run by 178 organizations received malicious JavaScript through no fault of those sites. The list includes CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, hardware wallet maker Ledger, and Peacock. The code rode in through Optimizely Web Experimentation, a testing tool whose snippet those sites load on every page. An attacker exploited a vulnerability in that tool and wrote a loader into customers' "Project JavaScript" fields, so each poisoned snippet still arrived from Optimizely's own delivery domain, and every browser that loaded one ran it as trusted. Security firm Report URI, whose researcher Scott Helme uncovered the attack, found the code in 188 of the 1,611 snippets it examined and says the real total is likely higher. Optimizely confirmed the incident in a notice posted at 01:02 UTC today, saying it fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, secured affected accounts, and added protections. BleepingComputer's writeup independently confirmed the injected code loading on affected sites.
The timeline defines your exposure window. Report URI traced the first injection to 04:21 UTC on November 16, in the BBC's snippet. The card-skimming component arrived at 13:43 UTC. A mass cleanup began around 20:40 UTC, and by 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk's snippet still carried the code. One detail keeps this from being a closed case: Smartsheet's script was cleaned once and then re-infected with a hidden variant, which Report URI reads as evidence the attacker still held access at that point. Optimizely's notice does not say how the flaw worked, how many projects were changed, or whether the attacker retains any access.
The payload did three things in a visitor's browser. It scanned page text, forms, links, and the clipboard for wallet addresses on eight chains, from Bitcoin to Dogecoin, and replaced any match near a payment word with the attacker's own address. Report URI put receipts into attacker wallets at about $7,040 as of 19:25 UTC on November 16 and described cryptocurrency as already stolen. Treat that as a reported observation, not a settled total, since blockchain records cannot show which transfers came from victims. Second, it skimmed payment cards: it watched form submissions for a card number plus expiry and security code, then sent the set to the attacker's server. It could only reach card fields built directly into a site's own pages. Cards typed inside a payment provider's hosted frame, such as Stripe's or Adyen's, sit in a separate page the script cannot read. After a swap it also sent page cookies and a screenshot to the attacker, though HttpOnly cookies stayed out of reach. Third, on iPhones and iPads it loaded a second stage Report URI identifies as the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. The firm reports no iPhones actually taken over.
Check these two things today
Start with card statements. The skimmer needed you to type a card number into a site's own form on Monday. If you bought anything on November 16 from one of the big names above, open your statements now and look for charges you do not recognize. Report anything unfamiliar to your bank, and ask for a replacement card if you paid through a site's own checkout that day. If you only browsed, you were outside the capture path.
Then check any crypto you moved Monday. Open each transfer in your wallet and compare the destination address against the one you meant to pay. If the two differ, the address was swapped and the funds went to the attacker.
Lock down the accounts behind the cards
Stolen card numbers get used in two places: on the card itself, and as ingredients for new accounts opened in your name. Freeze your credit at Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion, which blocks new accounts outright, then add a fraud alert and keep the confirmation. If anything already looks wrong, file at IdentityTheft.gov for a free personal recovery plan. Our identity theft guide walks the full sequence with the checks that matter after any exposure.
One awkward fact: Equifax itself was among the sites serving the poisoned snippet. That does not change the advice, but change how you reach them. Navigate to the bureau sites and your bank by typing the address yourself or using a bookmark, never through a link in an email or message about this incident. Attackers reuse big headlines as phishing bait within hours.
Keep paper copies of what the screen can lose
Every incident this week made the same point from a different direction. Monday's Chase outage locked customers out of their own balance screens for a day (here is what the bank outage taught about cash). This one poisoned the screens themselves. The fix for both is the same unglamorous habit: keep the numbers that matter where no script and no outage can touch them. Write down account numbers, card customer-service numbers, and the confirmation numbers from any freeze or fraud alert, and keep them with your deeds and policies in one grabbable place. DocSafe Fireproof Document Bag The DocSafe bag runs about $19.98 and keeps passports, titles, and that account sheet organized with heat and splash resistance. Paper does not care about JavaScript. Our cyberattack guide covers the rest: food and water, a cash buffer, and a battery radio for official word when the network is the thing that broke.
A last note on the noise. This week also carried a viral claim that a nationwide blackout starts today, built on clipped video and a Pentagon readiness program for military bases. It is false, and we traced each piece of it here. Expect this attack to get the same treatment: inflated victim counts, fake refund portals, "check if you were hacked" links that are themselves the hack. Verify at the source, share slowly, and check your statements. That is the whole assignment.
Frequently asked questions
Was my card stolen if I visited CNN or Zoom on Monday?
Visiting alone was not enough. The skimmer only captured card numbers typed directly into a checkout form built into the site itself on November 16, and it could not read payment fields inside Stripe or Adyen hosted frames. If you paid that day, watch your statements and report anything you do not recognize.
How do I check whether a crypto payment went to the attacker?
Open the transfer in your wallet and compare the destination address against the one you meant to pay. The malware replaced valid addresses with its own in page text and the clipboard, so a pasted address may already have been swapped before you approved it.
Is the malicious code still on those sites?
Optimizely says it fixed the flaw and removed the injected code, and by late Monday night only one of 188 infected snippets still carried it. One site was re-infected after cleanup, so treat Monday exposures as real even though the code is now gone.